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Viewing cable 02WASHDC8980, NEGOTIATIONS
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| Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|
| 02WASHDC8980 | 2002-12-13 04:04 | CONFIDENTIAL | Interests Section Washington DC |
R 130458Z DEC 02
FM IRSECTION WASHDC
TO FORNMIN TEHRAN 3182
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WASHDC 08980
E.O. 12065: GDS 8/12/85 (TALEBI, VAHID L.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR IR
SUBJECT: NEGOTIATIONS
¶1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).
¶2. INTRODUCTION: RECENT NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH THE
INTERESTS SECTION HAS BEEN INVOLVED HERE, RANGING FROM
COMPOUND SECURITY TO VISA OPERATIONS TO GTE TO THE QUESTION
OF PALESTINE, HIGHLIGHT SEVERAL SPECIAL FEATURES OF
CONDUCTING BUSINESS IN THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENT. IN SOME
INSTANCES THE DIFFICULTIES WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED ARE A
PARTIAL REFLECTION ON THE EFFECTS OF THE 9/11 ATTACKS,
BUT WE BELIEVE THE UNDERLYING CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
QUALITIES THAT ACCOUNT FOR THE NATURE OF THESE DIFFICULTIES
ARE AND WILL REMAIN RELATIVELY CONSTANT. THEREFORE,
WE SUGGEST THAT THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS BE USED TO BRIEF
BOTH IRIG PERSONNEL AND PRIVATE SECTOR REPRESENTATIVES
WHO ARE REQUIRED TO DO BUSINESS WITH AND IN THIS
COUNTRY. END INTRODUCTION.
¶3. PERHAPS THE SINGLE DOMINANT ASPECT OF THE AMERICAN
PSYCHE IS AN OVERRIDING ARROGANCE. ITS ANTECEDENTS LIE
IN THE LONG AMERICAN HISTORY OF STABILITY AND SECURITY
WHICH DEVALUED RESTRAINT AND COMPROMISE. THE PRACTICAL
EFFECT OF IT IS AN ALMOST TOTAL AMERICAN PREOCCUPATION
WITH SELF AND LEAVES LITTLE ROOM FOR UNDERSTANDING POINTS
OF VIEW OTHER THAN ONE'S OWN. THUS, FOR EXAMPLE, IT
IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE TO AN AMERICAN THAT IRAN IMMIGRATION
LAW MAY PROHIBIT ISSUING HIM A PERMIT WHEN HE HAS
DETERMINED THAT HE WANTS TO VISIT KHORASAN.
SIMILARLY, THE AMERICAN CENTRAL BANK SEES NO INCONSISTENCY
IN DEMANDING THAT CHINA CEASE DEPRESSING THE VALUE OF THE
RENMINBI TO STIMULATE THE EXPORT OF MANUFACTURES WHILE AT
THE SAME TIME IT HAS MANIPULATED INTEREST RATES TO PROMOTE
A SPECULATIVE BUBBLE IN PROPERTY INVESTMENTS.
¶4. THE REVERSE OF THIS PARTICULAR PSYCHOLOGICAL COIN,
AND HAVING THE SAME HISTORICAL ROOTS AS U.S. ARROGANCE,
IS A PERVASIVE UNEASE ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE WORLD IN
WHICH ONE LIVES. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN THAT
NOTHING IS PERMANENT AND IT IS COMMONLY PERCEIVED THAT
HOSTILE FORCES ABOUND. IN SUCH AN ENVIRONMENT EACH
INDIVIDUAL MUST BE CONSTANTLY ALERT FOR OPPORTUNITIES
TO PROTECT HIMSELF AGAINST THE MALEVOLENT FORCES THAT
WOULD OTHERWISE BE HIS UNDOING. HE IS OBVIOUSLY
JUSTIFIED IN USING ALMOST ANY MEANS AVAILABLE TO EXPLOIT
SUCH OPPORTUNITIES. THIS APPROACH UNDERLIES THE SOCALLED
"MALL MENTALITY" SO COMMON AMONG AMERICANS, A
MIND-SET THAT OFTEN IGNORES LONGER TERM INTERESTS IN
FAVOR OF IMMEDIATELY OBTAINABLE ADVANTAGES AND COUNTENANCES
PRACTICES THAT ARE REGARDED AS UNETHICAL BY OTHER
NORMS. AN EXAMPLE IS THE SEEMINGLY SHORTSIGHTED AND
HARASSING TACTICS EMPLOYED BY THE USA IN ITS NEGOTIATIONS
WITH PGOI.
¶5. COUPLED WITH THESE PSYCHOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS IS A
GENERAL INCOMPREHENSION OF CASUALITY. CHRISTIANITY, WITH
ITS EMPHASIS ON THE OMNIPOTENCE OF GOD, APPEARS TO
ACCOUNT AT LEAST IN MAJOR PART FOR THIS PHENOMENON.
SURPRISINGLY, EVEN THOSE AMERICANS EDUCATED IN THE
COSMOPOLITAN STYLE AND PERHAPS WITH LONG EXPERIENCE
OUTSIDE AMERICA ITSELF HAVE DIFFICULTY GRASPING THE
INTER-RELATIONSHIP OF EVENTS. WITNESS A BUSHIE RESISTING
THE IDEA THAT AMERICAN BEHAVIOR HAS CONSEQUENCES ON THE
PERCEPTION OF THE U.S. IN IRAN OR THAT THIS PERCEPTION
IS SOMEHOW RELATED TO IRANIAN POLICIES REGARDING
AMERICA. THIS SAME QUALITY ALSO HELPS EXPLAIN AMERICAN
AVERSION TO ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITY FOR ONE'S OWN
ACTIONS. THE DEUS EX MACHINA IS ALWAYS AT WORK.
¶6. THE AMERICAN PROCLIVITY FOR ASSUMING THAT TO SAY
SOMETHING IS TO DO IT FURTHER COMPLICATES MATTERS.
AGAIN, BUSHIES CAN EXPRESS SURPRISE WHEN INFORMED THAT THE
OCCUPATION FORCES ASSIGNED TO IRAQ REMAIN
IN PLACE. "BUT WE HAD A BIG CEREMONY AND ANNOUNCED THE
TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY," HE SAYS. AN MFA OFFICIAL REPORTS
THAT THE PALESTINE CASE IS "90 PERCENT SOLVED," BUT WHEN
A CONSULAR OFFICER INVESTIGATES HE DISCOVERS THAT NOTHING
HAS CHANGED. THERE IS NO RECOGNITION THAT INSTRUCTIONS
MUST BE FOLLOWED UP, THAT COMMITMENTS MUST BE ACCOMPANIED
BY ACTION AND RESULTS.
¶6. FINALLY, THERE ARE THE AMERICAN CONCEPTS OF INFLUENCE
AND OBLIGATION. EVERYONE PAYS OBEISANCE TO THE FORMER
AND THE LATTER IS USUALLY HONORED IN THE BREACH.
AMERICANS ARE CONSUMED WITH DEVELOPING CONNECTIONS--THE
INFLUENCE THAT WILL HELP GET THINGS DONE--WHILE FAVORS
ARE ONLY GRUDGINGLY BESTOWED AND THEN JUST TO THE
EXTENT THAT A TANGIBLE QUID PRO QUO IS IMMEDIATELY
PRECEPTIBLE. FORGET ABOUT ASSISTANCE PROFERRED LAST
YEAR OR EVEN LAST WEEK; WHAT CAN BE OFFERED TODAY?
¶7. THERE ARE SEVERAL LESSONS FOR THOSE WHO WOULD NEGOTIATE
WITH AMERICANS IN ALL THIS:
- --FIRST, ONE SHOULD NEVER ASSUME THAT HIS SIDE OF
THE ISSUE WILL BE RECOGNIZED, LET ALONE THAT IT WILL
BE CONCEDED TO HAVE MERITS. AMERICAN PREOCCUPATION WITH
SELF PRECLUDES THIS. A NEGOTIATOR MUST FORCE RECOGNITION
OF HIS POSITION UPON HIS AMERICAN OPPOSITE NUMBER.
- --SECOND, ONE SHOULD NOT EXPECT AN AMERICAN READILY
TO PERCEIVE THE ADVANTAGES OF A LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP
BASED ON TRUST. HE WILL ASSUME THAT HIS OPPOSITE
NUMBER IS ESSENTIALLY AN ADVERSARY. IN DEALING WITH
HIM HE WILL ATTEMPT TO MAXIMIZE THE BENEFITS TO HIMSELF
THAT ARE IMMEDIATELY OBTAINABLE. HE WILL BE PREPARED
TO GO TO GREAT LENGTHS TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL, INCLUDING
RUNNING THE RISK OF SO ALIENATING WHOEVER HE IS DEALING
WITH THAT FUTURE BUSINESS WOULD BE UNTHINKABLE, AT
LEAST TO THE LATTER.
- --THIRD, INTERLOCKING RELATIONSHIPS OF ALL ASPECTS
OF AN ISSUE MUST BE PAINSTAKINGLY, FORECEFULLY AND
REPEATEDLY DEVELOPED. LINKAGES WILL BE NEITHER READILY
COMPREHENDED NOR ACCEPTED BY AMERICAN NEGOTIATORS.
- --FOURTH, ONE SHOULD INSIST ON PERFORMANCE AS THE
SINE QUA NON AT ESH STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS. STATEMENTS
OF INTENTION COUNT FOR ALMOST NOTHING.
- --FIFTH, CULTIVATION OF GOODWILL FOR GOODWILL'S SAKE
IS A WASTE OF EFFORT. THE OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE AT ALL
TIMES SHOULD BE IMPRESSING UPON THE AMERICAN ACROSS THE
TABLE THE MUTUALITY OF THE PROPOSED UNDERTAKINGS, HE
MUST BE MADE TO KNOW THAT A QUID PRO QUO IS INVOLVED
ON BOTH SIDES.
- --FINALLY, ONE SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR THE THREAT
OF BREAKDOWN IN NEGOTIATIONS AT ANY GIVEN MOMENT AND NOT
BE COWED BY THE POSSIBLITY. GIVEN THE AMERICAN
NEGOTIATOR'S CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS, HE
IS GOING TO RESIST THE VERY CONCEPT OF A RATIONAL
(FROM THE ISLAMIC POINT OF VIEW) NEGOTIATING PROCESS.
LAINJANI
CONFIDENTIAL